This course does not confuse slips, trips and falls with process safety nor is it another session about the Baker report, the Cullen report, Montara or Macondo (Deep water Horizon). What this course does is consider the impact of lessons learned on day to day practice, and draws the conclusion that treating safety as an addition complicates matters.
Despite Safety Case regimes, the majority of conclusions from major incidents which have occurred over the past thirty years have a very common theme; that there is a human gap between theory and practice. This course works towards the outcomes we all desire and deserve, focusing on integrating process safety with normal day to day business.
Who is responsible for process safety in your organization? Ultimately it is the executive and by delegation the managers and supervisors in the production function. Yet those involved in the decision-making process must be fully educated due to the level of risk involved with process safety. This course is aimed at those leaders, managers, and supervisors that bear this responsibility but perhaps without the necessary understanding of how to blend process safety with the reality of production.
You Will Learn How to
- Practically understand the fundamentals that enables you to learn the principles of process safety
- Use a simple model to proactively improve process safety and integrity
- Align the safety procedures and systems needed to gain regulatory approval with the model for continuous improvement of process safety
- Use easier ways of communicating with operators, who can then understand and proactively avoid safety risks
This course aims to teach in an interesting and new way, to demystify process safety, because everybody needs to understand process safety not just engineers.
Topics covered in this course span both technical content and the latest thinking in complexity science and its impact on human cognition.
Technical topics: Safety cases, performance standards, inherent safety, safety integrity levels, HAZOP, bow ties, and LOPA, will all be covered, alongside quantitative risk assessment.
Complexity Science topics: Human decision making, relationship complexity, competition on limited resources.
Performance improvement topics: Process safety pyramid, leading indicators and integration with asset management.
If you are a permit operator of a Major Accident Hazard installation you must have a Major Accident Prevention Policy.
However, can you meet all the requirements? Have you balanced the requirements with workforce capacity? Has the Safety Case been added to an already heavily loaded organisation?
Otherwise known as ‘Technical Safety’ we deal with the prevention of Major Accidents. Attention to slips, trips and falls (personnel safety) does not contribute to process safety. Overdoing slips, trips and falls prevention can detract from process safety.
- Understanding risk is the basis of all safety assessment
- Inherent Safety removes or reduces the risk and hence the need for mitigation
- HAZID, HAZAN, HAZOP, CHAZOP are all methods of risk assessment and the identification of mitigation's
- The Bow Tie method illustrates the mitigations and differentiates between proactive and reactive risk management
- QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) measures the residual risk post mitigation and documents the contribution of each risk reduction activity
- Safety instrumented systems are commonly used methods of risk mitigation
- SIL (Safety Integrity Level) is used to quantify the risk reduction requirement and hence the reliability required of safety instrumented systems
- LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) is used to reduce risk that cannot be easily mitigated by a single layer of protection such as a safety instrumented system.
Despite our many efforts in the field of safety we still have incidents and major accidents. Data shows that most root causes for the last two decades relate to human decision making.
Human decision making is impaired by complexity, yet we continue to add complication in the form of new safety initiatives. The complicated becomes complex when relationships between variables are not understood or when many things are competing for a limited resource (in this case workforce capacity).
Process Safety Pyramid
Practice and theory are two very different things. Most technicians do not understand process safety because they have never been taught the principles. We build on the basics taught on the first day to introduce a practical model of the layers of protection a technician deals with every day.
We introduce practical metrics to keep track of the integrity of our layers of protection. TRIR etc tell you nothing about proactive prevention of incidents.
Performance Standards and Procedures
There are no international standards for procedures. It is vitally important that the activity dictated by performance standards and procedures addresses the availability of protective layers. They are not just another work instruction.
Safety by addition is doomed to fail if there are not adequate resources to maintain the addition. Safety cases will fail to fulfil their purpose if they are added to an organization without consideration of the impact on resources. Too many Safety Cases aim to introduce control rather than improve safety.
Good asset management practice will ensure the Safety Case delivers. A safety case does not stand alone and should not take the form of a manual that sits on a shelf to satisfy regulations. It should only reflect what is done on a day to day basis and provide an improvement process.
Upon completion, you will receive a Worley Academy Certificate of Completion.